The Aguilera
affidavit
The ATF used an
affidavit filed by Davy Aguilera to
obtain the warrant that led to the Waco siege.
The official filing date of this Affidavit was the 25th of February 1993. Allegedly, the initial investigation began in
June of 1992 when a postal worker informed a Sheriff of McClennan County that he believed he had been delivering
explosives to the ammo and gun store owned and operated by the Branch Davidians. This store named the "Mag-Bag", had been identified
by said postal worker as suspicious in deliveries. The postal worker continued
deliveries to the Mt. Carmel Center
and reported seeing manned observation posts; in the affidavit, it states he
believed they were armed personnel at these observations posts.
The McClennan county
sheriff was notified in May and June of that year of two cases of inert
grenades, black gunpowder, 90 pounds of powdered aluminum metal, and 30-40
cardboard tubes. Furthermore, the sheriff noticed another shipment of sixty
AR-15/M-16 magazines, to which Davy
Aguilera made the statement, "I
have been involved in many cases where defendants, following a relatively
simple process, convert AR-15 semi-automatic rifles to fully automatic rifles
of the nature of the M-16" to justify the ATF's involvement in the case.
Another report was made to the Sheriff in November of 1992
by a local farmer who believed he heard machine gunfire. "By the sound of it," he said, "it was likely a .50 caliber machine gun and multiple
M-16's." This farmer claimed he was very familiar with machine guns,
having done a tour overseas in the U.S
Army. The affidavit closes with Aguilera verifying the story via interviews
made with associated parties and gun shops from which the Mag-Bag purchased items. Among these items were over forty-five
AR-15 upper receivers and five M-16 upper receivers, which Aguilera clearly
annotates, "These kits contain all
the parts of an M-16 machine gun except for the lower receiver unit which is
the "firearm" by lawful
definition," admitting that neither the noise complaints nor the items
ordered were necessarily illegal.
Department of Human
Services is noted in the affidavit as well. BATF happened to get statements from a department worker who
managed to investigate a case on the Carmel
site. This agent, Joyce Sparks, had
two separate visits to the grounds where she questioned members of the Branch Davidians and toured the
compound. The first visit involved interviewing a young boy of the compound "who was in a rush to grow up so he can
have a long gun." This issue was not looked into until Ms. Joyce's
second visit when she was able to speak to David Koresh himself. He nonchalantly mentioned there were only a
few guns, but when Ms. Joyce asked if it is okay to tour the compound, he
requested she wait for thirty minutes so he can hide any guns from members not
shown the guns. During this tour was when Ms. Joyce looked inside a trap door
and noticed a buried bus with a refrigerator at the end. It was obvious the
refrigerator was used as target practice by the Davidians, with the bullet holes in it and the guns strewn along
the floor of this makeshift basement.
ATF raid
Preparations
Using the affidavit filed by Aguilera that alleged that the Davidians had violated federal law, the ATF obtained search and arrest warrants
for Koresh and specific followers on weapons charges, citing the many firearms
they had accumulated. The search warrant
commanded a search "on or before
February 28, 1993", in the daytime between 6:00 AM and 10:00 PM. ATF made a claim that Koresh was
possibly operating a methamphetamine lab, to establish a drug nexus and obtain
military assets under the War on Drugs.
Although the ATF's investigation "focused
on firearm violations, not on illegal drugs", the ATF requested assistance from the DEA and the DOD "citing a
drug connection" based on 1) a recent delivery to the compound of "chemicals, instruments, and
glassware", 2) a written testimony from a former compound's resident,
alleging "Howell had told him that
drug trafficking was a desirable way to raise money", 3) several
current residents who "had prior
drug involvement", 4) two former residents who were incarcerated for
drug-trafficking crimes and 5) National
Guard overflights' thermal images showing a "hot spot inside the compound, possibly indicating a methamphetamine
laboratory". Although the
original request for assistance was initially approved, the commander of the Special Forces detachment questioned
the request and the ATF obtained
only a training site at Fort Hood, Texas,
from February 25 to February 27 with safety inspections for the training lanes,
and was given only medical and communications training and equipment.
ATF had planned
their raid for Monday, March 1, 1993, with the code name "Showtime". The ATF
later claimed that the raid was moved up a day, to February 28, 1993, in
response to the Waco Tribune-Herald's
“The Sinful Messiah" "
series of articles (which the ATF
had tried to prevent it from being published). Beginning February 1, ATF agents had three meetings with Tribune-Herald staff regarding a delay in the publication of "The Sinful Messiah". The
paper was first told by ATF that the
raid would take place on February 22, which they changed to March 1, and then
ultimately to an indefinite date. ATF agents felt the newspaper had held
off publication at the request of the ATF
for at least three weeks. In a February 24 meeting between Tribune-Herald staff and ATF agent Phillip Chojancki and two
other agents, ATF could not give the
newspaper staff a clear idea of what action was planned or when. The Tribune-Herald informed ATF they were publishing the series,
which included an editorial calling for local authorities to act. Personnel of
the Tribune-Herald found out about
the imminent raid after the first installment of "The Sinful Messiah" had already appeared on February 27.
Although the ATF
preferred to arrest Koresh when he was outside Mount Carmel, planners received inaccurate information that Koresh
rarely left it. The Branch Davidian members were well known locally and had cordial
relations with other locals. The Branch
Davidians partly supported themselves by trading at gun shows and took care
to have the relevant paperwork to ensure their transactions were legal. Branch Davidian Paul Fatta was a
federal firearms licensed dealer, and the group operated a retail gun business
called the Mag Bag. When shipments
for the Mag Bag arrived, they were
signed for by Fatta, Steve Schneider,
or Koresh. The morning of the raid, Paul
Fatta and son Kalani were on their way to an Austin, Texas, gun show to conduct business.
February 28
The ATF attempted
to execute their search warrant on Sunday morning, February 28, 1993. The local
sheriff, in audiotapes broadcast after the incident, said he was not apprised
of the raid. Despite being informed that the Branch Davidians knew a raid was coming, the ATF commander ordered that it go ahead, even though their plan
depended on reaching the compound without the Branch Davidians being armed and
prepared. While not standard procedure, ATF agents had their blood type written
on their arms or neck after leaving the staging area and before the raid,
because it was recommended by the military to facilitate speedy blood
transfusions in the case of injury.
Any advantage of surprise was lost when a KWTX-TV reporter who had been tipped off
about the raid asked for directions from a U.S.
Postal Service mail carrier who was coincidentally Koresh's brother-in-law.
Koresh then told undercover ATF agent Robert Rodriguez that they
knew a raid was imminent. Rodriguez had infiltrated the Branch Davidians and was astonished to find that his cover had been
blown. The agent made an excuse and left the compound. When asked later what
the Branch Davidians had been doing
when he left the compound, Rodriguez replied, "They were praying." Branch
Davidian survivors have written that Koresh ordered selected male followers
to begin arming and taking up defensive positions, while the women and children
were told to take cover in their rooms. Koresh
told them he would try to speak to the agents, and what happened next would
depend on the agents' intentions. The ATF
arrived at 9:45 AM in a convoy of civilian vehicles containing uniformed
personnel in SWAT-style tactical
gear.
ATF agents stated
that they heard shots coming from within the compound, while Branch Davidian survivors claimed that
the first shots came from the ATF agents
outside. A suggested reason may have been an accidental discharge of a weapon,
possibly by an ATF agent, causing
the ATF to respond with fire from
automatic weapons. Other reports claim
the first shots were fired by the ATF
"dog team" sent to kill the
dogs in the Branch Davidian
kennel. Three helicopters of the Army National Guard were used as an aerial distraction, and all took
incoming fire. During the first shots,
Koresh was wounded, shot in the hand and in the stomach. Within a minute of the
raid starting, Branch Davidian Wayne Martin called emergency services, pleading
for them to stop shooting. The resident
asked for a ceasefire, and audiotapes record him saying, "Here they come again!" and, "That's them shooting! That's not us!"
The first ATF
casualty was an agent who had made it to the west side of the building before
he was wounded. Agents quickly took cover and fired at the buildings while the
helicopters began their diversion and swept in low over the complex, 350 feet
(105 m) away from the building. The Branch Davidians fired on the
helicopters and hit them, without injuring the crew, and the helicopters
immediately stopped the mission and landed. On the east side of the compound, agents
hauled out two ladders and set them against the side of the building. Agents
then climbed onto the roof with the objective of securing it to reach Koresh's
room and the arms storage. On the west
slope of the roof, three agents reached Koresh's window and were crouching
beside it when they came under fire. One agent was killed and another wounded.
The third agent scampered over the peak of the roof and joined other agents
attempting to enter the arms room. The window was smashed, a flashbang stun
grenade was thrown in, and three agents entered the arms room. When another
tried to follow them, a hail of bullets penetrated the wall and wounded him,
but he was able to reach a ladder and slide to safety. An agent fired with his
shotgun at Branch Davidians until he
was hit in the head by return fire and killed. Inside the arms room, the agents killed a Branch Davidian and discovered a cache
of weapons but then came under heavy fire; two were wounded. As they escaped,
the third agent laid down covering fire, killing a Branch Davidian. As he made his escape, he hit his head on a wooden
support beam and fell off the roof but survived. An agent outside provided them
with covering fire but was shot by a Branch
Davidian and killed instantly. Dozens of ATF agents took cover, many behind Branch Davidian vehicles, and exchanged fire with the Branch Davidians. The number of ATF wounded increased, and an agent
was killed by gunfire from the compound as agents were firing at a Branch Davidian perched on top of the
water tower. The exchange of fire continued, but 45 minutes into the raid the
gunfire began to slow down as agents began to run low on ammunition. The shooting
continued for two hours.
Sheriff Lt. Lynch
of the McLennan County Sheriff
Department contacted the ATF and
negotiated a ceasefire. Sheriff Harwell
states in William Gazecki's
documentary Waco: The Rules of Engagement
that the ATF agents withdrew only
after they were out of ammunition. ATF
agent Chuck Hustmyre later wrote: "About
45 minutes into the shootout, the volume of gunfire finally started to slacken.
We were running out of ammunition. The
Davidians, however, had plenty." In all, four ATF agents (Steve Willis,
Robert Williams, Todd McKeehan, and Conway Charles LeBleu) had been killed during the firefight.
Another 16 had been injured. After the ceasefire, the Branch Davidians allowed the
ATF dead and wounded to be evacuated and held their fire during the ATF retreat.
The five Branch
Davidians killed in the raid were Winston
Blake, Peter Gent, Peter Hipsman, Perry Jones, and Jaydean
Wendell; two were killed at the hands of the Branch Davidians after having been wounded. Their bodies were buried on the grounds.
Nearly six hours after the 11:30 AM ceasefire, Michael Schroeder was shot dead by ATF agents who alleged he fired a pistol at agents as he attempted
to re-enter the compound with Woodrow
Kendrick and Norman Allison.
Alan A. Stone's report
states that the Branch Davidians did
not ambush the ATF and that they "apparently did not maximize the kill
of ATF agents", explaining that they were rather "desperate religious fanatics expecting an apocalyptic ending, in
which they were destined to die defending their sacred ground and destined to
achieve salvation." A 1999 federal report noted:
The violent tendencies of dangerous cults can be classified
into two general categories——defensive violence and offensive violence.
Defensive violence is utilized by cults to defend a compound or enclave that
was created specifically to eliminate most contact with the dominant culture.
The 1993 clash in Waco, Texas at the
Branch Davidian complex is an
illustration of such defensive violence. History has shown that groups that
seek to withdraw from the dominant culture seldom act on their beliefs that the
endtime has come unless provoked.
No comments:
Post a Comment