Monday, March 23, 2020

Waco Stand-Off: David Koresh and the Branch Davidians (Part II)


The Aguilera affidavit
The ATF used an affidavit filed by Davy Aguilera to obtain the warrant that led to the Waco siege. The official filing date of this Affidavit was the 25th of February 1993.  Allegedly, the initial investigation began in June of 1992 when a postal worker informed a Sheriff of McClennan County that he believed he had been delivering explosives to the ammo and gun store owned and operated by the Branch Davidians. This store named the "Mag-Bag", had been identified by said postal worker as suspicious in deliveries. The postal worker continued deliveries to the Mt. Carmel Center and reported seeing manned observation posts; in the affidavit, it states he believed they were armed personnel at these observations posts.
The McClennan county sheriff was notified in May and June of that year of two cases of inert grenades, black gunpowder, 90 pounds of powdered aluminum metal, and 30-40 cardboard tubes. Furthermore, the sheriff noticed another shipment of sixty AR-15/M-16 magazines, to which Davy Aguilera made the statement, "I have been involved in many cases where defendants, following a relatively simple process, convert AR-15 semi-automatic rifles to fully automatic rifles of the nature of the M-16" to justify the ATF's involvement in the case.
Another report was made to the Sheriff in November of 1992 by a local farmer who believed he heard machine gunfire. "By the sound of it," he said, "it was likely a .50 caliber machine gun and multiple M-16's." This farmer claimed he was very familiar with machine guns, having done a tour overseas in the U.S Army. The affidavit closes with Aguilera verifying the story via interviews made with associated parties and gun shops from which the Mag-Bag purchased items. Among these items were over forty-five AR-15 upper receivers and five M-16 upper receivers, which Aguilera clearly annotates, "These kits contain all the parts of an M-16 machine gun except for the lower receiver unit which is the "firearm" by lawful definition," admitting that neither the noise complaints nor the items ordered were necessarily illegal.
Department of Human Services is noted in the affidavit as well. BATF happened to get statements from a department worker who managed to investigate a case on the Carmel site. This agent, Joyce Sparks, had two separate visits to the grounds where she questioned members of the Branch Davidians and toured the compound. The first visit involved interviewing a young boy of the compound "who was in a rush to grow up so he can have a long gun." This issue was not looked into until Ms. Joyce's second visit when she was able to speak to David Koresh himself. He nonchalantly mentioned there were only a few guns, but when Ms. Joyce asked if it is okay to tour the compound, he requested she wait for thirty minutes so he can hide any guns from members not shown the guns. During this tour was when Ms. Joyce looked inside a trap door and noticed a buried bus with a refrigerator at the end. It was obvious the refrigerator was used as target practice by the Davidians, with the bullet holes in it and the guns strewn along the floor of this makeshift basement.
ATF raid
Preparations
Using the affidavit filed by Aguilera that alleged that the Davidians had violated federal law, the ATF obtained search and arrest warrants for Koresh and specific followers on weapons charges, citing the many firearms they had accumulated.  The search warrant commanded a search "on or before February 28, 1993", in the daytime between 6:00 AM and 10:00 PM. ATF made a claim that Koresh was possibly operating a methamphetamine lab, to establish a drug nexus and obtain military assets under the War on Drugs.  Although the ATF's investigation "focused on firearm violations, not on illegal drugs", the ATF requested assistance from the DEA and the DOD "citing a drug connection" based on 1) a recent delivery to the compound of "chemicals, instruments, and glassware", 2) a written testimony from a former compound's resident, alleging "Howell had told him that drug trafficking was a desirable way to raise money", 3) several current residents who "had prior drug involvement", 4) two former residents who were incarcerated for drug-trafficking crimes and 5) National Guard overflights' thermal images showing a "hot spot inside the compound, possibly indicating a methamphetamine laboratory".  Although the original request for assistance was initially approved, the commander of the Special Forces detachment questioned the request and the ATF obtained only a training site at Fort Hood, Texas, from February 25 to February 27 with safety inspections for the training lanes, and was given only medical and communications training and equipment.
ATF had planned their raid for Monday, March 1, 1993, with the code name "Showtime". The ATF later claimed that the raid was moved up a day, to February 28, 1993, in response to the Waco Tribune-Herald's “The Sinful Messiah" " series of articles (which the ATF had tried to prevent it from being published).  Beginning February 1, ATF agents had three meetings with Tribune-Herald staff regarding a delay in the publication of "The Sinful Messiah". The paper was first told by ATF that the raid would take place on February 22, which they changed to March 1, and then ultimately to an indefinite date.  ATF agents felt the newspaper had held off publication at the request of the ATF for at least three weeks. In a February 24 meeting between Tribune-Herald staff and ATF agent Phillip Chojancki and two other agents, ATF could not give the newspaper staff a clear idea of what action was planned or when. The Tribune-Herald informed ATF they were publishing the series, which included an editorial calling for local authorities to act. Personnel of the Tribune-Herald found out about the imminent raid after the first installment of "The Sinful Messiah" had already appeared on February 27.
Although the ATF preferred to arrest Koresh when he was outside Mount Carmel, planners received inaccurate information that Koresh rarely left it.  The Branch Davidian members were well known locally and had cordial relations with other locals. The Branch Davidians partly supported themselves by trading at gun shows and took care to have the relevant paperwork to ensure their transactions were legal.  Branch Davidian Paul Fatta was a federal firearms licensed dealer, and the group operated a retail gun business called the Mag Bag. When shipments for the Mag Bag arrived, they were signed for by Fatta, Steve Schneider, or Koresh. The morning of the raid, Paul Fatta and son Kalani were on their way to an Austin, Texas, gun show to conduct business.
February 28
The ATF attempted to execute their search warrant on Sunday morning, February 28, 1993. The local sheriff, in audiotapes broadcast after the incident, said he was not apprised of the raid. Despite being informed that the Branch Davidians knew a raid was coming, the ATF commander ordered that it go ahead, even though their plan depended on reaching the compound without the Branch Davidians being armed and prepared.  While not standard procedure, ATF agents had their blood type written on their arms or neck after leaving the staging area and before the raid, because it was recommended by the military to facilitate speedy blood transfusions in the case of injury.
Any advantage of surprise was lost when a KWTX-TV reporter who had been tipped off about the raid asked for directions from a U.S. Postal Service mail carrier who was coincidentally Koresh's brother-in-law.  Koresh then told undercover ATF agent Robert Rodriguez that they knew a raid was imminent. Rodriguez had infiltrated the Branch Davidians and was astonished to find that his cover had been blown. The agent made an excuse and left the compound. When asked later what the Branch Davidians had been doing when he left the compound, Rodriguez replied, "They were praying." Branch Davidian survivors have written that Koresh ordered selected male followers to begin arming and taking up defensive positions, while the women and children were told to take cover in their rooms.  Koresh told them he would try to speak to the agents, and what happened next would depend on the agents' intentions. The ATF arrived at 9:45 AM in a convoy of civilian vehicles containing uniformed personnel in SWAT-style tactical gear.
ATF agents stated that they heard shots coming from within the compound, while Branch Davidian survivors claimed that the first shots came from the ATF agents outside. A suggested reason may have been an accidental discharge of a weapon, possibly by an ATF agent, causing the ATF to respond with fire from automatic weapons.  Other reports claim the first shots were fired by the ATF "dog team" sent to kill the dogs in the Branch Davidian kennel.   Three helicopters of the Army National Guard were used as an aerial distraction, and all took incoming fire.  During the first shots, Koresh was wounded, shot in the hand and in the stomach. Within a minute of the raid starting, Branch Davidian Wayne Martin called emergency services, pleading for them to stop shooting.  The resident asked for a ceasefire, and audiotapes record him saying, "Here they come again!" and, "That's them shooting! That's not us!"
The first ATF casualty was an agent who had made it to the west side of the building before he was wounded. Agents quickly took cover and fired at the buildings while the helicopters began their diversion and swept in low over the complex, 350 feet (105 m) away from the building.  The Branch Davidians fired on the helicopters and hit them, without injuring the crew, and the helicopters immediately stopped the mission and landed.  On the east side of the compound, agents hauled out two ladders and set them against the side of the building. Agents then climbed onto the roof with the objective of securing it to reach Koresh's room and the arms storage.  On the west slope of the roof, three agents reached Koresh's window and were crouching beside it when they came under fire. One agent was killed and another wounded. The third agent scampered over the peak of the roof and joined other agents attempting to enter the arms room. The window was smashed, a flashbang stun grenade was thrown in, and three agents entered the arms room. When another tried to follow them, a hail of bullets penetrated the wall and wounded him, but he was able to reach a ladder and slide to safety. An agent fired with his shotgun at Branch Davidians until he was hit in the head by return fire and killed.  Inside the arms room, the agents killed a Branch Davidian and discovered a cache of weapons but then came under heavy fire; two were wounded. As they escaped, the third agent laid down covering fire, killing a Branch Davidian. As he made his escape, he hit his head on a wooden support beam and fell off the roof but survived. An agent outside provided them with covering fire but was shot by a Branch Davidian and killed instantly. Dozens of ATF agents took cover, many behind Branch Davidian vehicles, and exchanged fire with the Branch Davidians. The number of ATF wounded increased, and an agent was killed by gunfire from the compound as agents were firing at a Branch Davidian perched on top of the water tower. The exchange of fire continued, but 45 minutes into the raid the gunfire began to slow down as agents began to run low on ammunition. The shooting continued for two hours.
Sheriff Lt. Lynch of the McLennan County Sheriff Department contacted the ATF and negotiated a ceasefire.  Sheriff Harwell states in William Gazecki's documentary Waco: The Rules of Engagement that the ATF agents withdrew only after they were out of ammunition.   ATF agent Chuck Hustmyre later wrote: "About 45 minutes into the shootout, the volume of gunfire finally started to slacken. We were running out of ammunition. The Davidians, however, had plenty." In all, four ATF agents (Steve Willis, Robert Williams, Todd McKeehan, and Conway Charles LeBleu) had been killed during the firefight. Another 16 had been injured. After the ceasefire, the Branch Davidians allowed the ATF dead and wounded to be evacuated and held their fire during the ATF retreat.
The five Branch Davidians killed in the raid were Winston Blake, Peter Gent, Peter Hipsman, Perry Jones, and Jaydean Wendell; two were killed at the hands of the Branch Davidians after having been wounded.  Their bodies were buried on the grounds. Nearly six hours after the 11:30 AM ceasefire, Michael Schroeder was shot dead by ATF agents who alleged he fired a pistol at agents as he attempted to re-enter the compound with Woodrow Kendrick and Norman Allison.
Alan A. Stone's report states that the Branch Davidians did not ambush the ATF and that they "apparently did not maximize the kill of ATF agents", explaining that they were rather "desperate religious fanatics expecting an apocalyptic ending, in which they were destined to die defending their sacred ground and destined to achieve salvation."   A 1999 federal report noted:
The violent tendencies of dangerous cults can be classified into two general categories——defensive violence and offensive violence. Defensive violence is utilized by cults to defend a compound or enclave that was created specifically to eliminate most contact with the dominant culture. The 1993 clash in Waco, Texas at the Branch Davidian complex is an illustration of such defensive violence. History has shown that groups that seek to withdraw from the dominant culture seldom act on their beliefs that the endtime has come unless provoked.

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