Recovery of debris and crew
Immediately after the disaster, the NASA Launch Recovery
Director launched the two SRB recovery ships, MV Freedom Star and MV Liberty
Star, to proceed to the impact area to recover debris, and requested the
support of US military aircraft and ships. Owing to falling debris from the
explosion, the RSO kept recovery forces from the impact area until 12:37 p.m.
The size of the recovery operations increased to 12 aircraft and 8 ships by
7:00 p.m. Surface operations recovered debris from the orbiter and external
tank. The surface recovery operations ended on February 7.
On January 31, the US Navy was tasked with submarine
recovery operations. The search efforts prioritized the recovery of the right
SRB, followed by the crew compartment, and then the remaining payload, orbiter
pieces, and ET. The search for debris formally began on February 8 with the
rescue and salvages ship USS Preserver, and eventually grew to sixteen ships,
of which three were managed by NASA, four by the US Navy, one by the US Air
Force, and eight by independent contractors. The surface ships used side-scan
sonar to make the initial search for debris and covered 486 square nautical
miles (1,670 km2) at water depths between 70 feet (21 m) and 1,200 feet (370
m). The sonar operations discovered 881 potential locations for debris, of
which 187 pieces were later confirmed to be from the orbiter.
The debris from the SRBs was widely distributed due to the
detonation of their linear-shaped charges. The identification of SRB material
was primarily conducted by crewed submarines and submersibles. The vehicles
were dispatched to investigate potential debris located during the search
phase. Surface ships lifted the SRB debris with the help of technical divers
and underwater remotely operated vehicles to attach the necessary slings to
raise the debris with cranes. The solid propellant in the SRBs posed a risk,
as it became more volatile after being submerged. Recovered portions of the
SRBs were kept wet during recovery, and their unused propellant was ignited
once they were brought ashore. The failed joint on the right SRB was first
located on sonar on March 1. Subsequent dives to 560 ft (170 m) by the NR-1
submarine on April 5 and the SEA-LINK I submersible on April 12 confirmed that
it was the damaged field joint, and it was successfully recovered on April 13.
Of the 196,726 lb (89,233 kg) of both SRB shells, 102,500 lb (46,500 kg) was
recovered, another 54,000 lb (24,000 kg) was found but not recovered, and
40,226 lb (18,246 kg) was never found.
On March 7, Air Force divers identified potential crew
compartment debris, which was confirmed the next day by divers from the USS
Preserver. The damage to the crew compartment indicated that it had remained
largely intact during the initial explosion but was extensively damaged when it
impacted the ocean. The remains of the crew were badly damaged from impact and
submersion and were not intact bodies. The USS Preserver made multiple trips
to return debris and remains to port, and continued crew compartment recovery
until April 4. During the recovery of the remains of the crew, Jarvis's body
floated away and was not located until April 15, several weeks after the other
remains had been positively identified. Once remains were brought to port,
pathologists from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology worked to identify
the human remains, but could not determine the exact cause of death for any of
them. Medical examiners in Brevard County disputed the legality of transferring
human remains to US military officials to conduct autopsies, and refused to
issue the death certificates; NASA officials ultimately released the death certificates
of the crew members.
The IUS that would have been used to boost the orbit of the
TDRS-B satellite was one of the first pieces of debris recovered. There was no
indication that there had been premature ignition of the IUS, which had been
one of the suspected causes of the disaster. Debris from the three SSMEs was
recovered from February 14 to 28, and post-recovery analysis produced results
consistent with functional engines suddenly losing their LH2 fuel supply.
Deepwater recovery operations continued until April 29, with smaller-scale,
shallow recovery operations continuing until August 29. On December 17, 1996,
two pieces of the orbiter were found at Cocoa Beach. On November 10, 2022, NASA
announced that a 20-foot (6 m) piece of the shuttle had been found near the
site of a destroyed World War II-era aircraft off the coast of Florida. The
discovery was aired on the History Channel on November 22, 2022. Almost all
recovered non-organic debris from Challenger is buried in Cape Canaveral Space
Force Station missile silos at LC-31 and LC-32.
Funeral ceremonies
On April 29, 1986, the astronauts' remains were transferred
on a C-141 Starlifter aircraft from Kennedy Space Center to the military
mortuary at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. Their caskets were each draped
with an American flag and carried past an honor guard followed by an
astronaut escort. After the remains arrived at Dover Air Force Base, they were
transferred to the families of the crew members. Scobee and Smith were buried
at Arlington National Cemetery. Onizuka was buried at the National Memorial
Cemetery of the Pacific in Honolulu, Hawaii. McNair was buried in Rest Lawn
Memorial Park in Lake City, South Carolina, but his remains were later moved
within the town to the Dr. Ronald E. McNair Memorial Park. Resnik was cremated
and her ashes were scattered over the water. McAuliffe was buried at Calvary
Cemetery in Concord, New Hampshire. Jarvis was cremated, and his ashes were scattered
in the Pacific Ocean. The unidentified crew remains were buried at the Space Shuttle
Challenger Memorial in Arlington on May 20, 1986.
Public response
White House response
President Ronald Reagan had been scheduled to give the 1986
State of the Union Address on January 28, 1986, the evening of the Challenger
disaster. After a discussion with his aides, Reagan postponed the State of the
Union and instead addressed the nation about the disaster from the Oval
Office. On January 31, Ronald and Nancy Reagan traveled to the Johnson Space
Center to speak at a memorial service honoring the crew members. During the
ceremony, an Air Force band sang "God
Bless America" as NASA T-38 Talon jets flew directly over the scene in
the traditional missing-man formation.
Soon after the disaster, US politicians expressed concern
that White House officials, including Chief of Staff Donald Regan and
Communications Director Pat Buchanan, had pressured NASA to launch Challenger
before the scheduled January 28 State of the Union address, because Reagan had
planned to mention the launch in his remarks. In March 1986, the White House
released a copy of the original State of the Union speech. In that speech,
Reagan had intended to mention an X-ray experiment launched on Challenger and
designed by a guest he had invited to the address, but he did not further discuss
the Challenger launch. In the rescheduled State of the Union address on
February 4, Reagan mentioned the deceased Challenger crew members and modified
his remarks about the X-ray experiment as "launched
and lost". In April 1986, the White House released a report that
concluded there had been no pressure from the White House for NASA to launch
Challenger before the State of the Union.
Media coverage
Nationally televised coverage of the launch and explosion
was provided by CNN. To promote the Teacher in Space program with McAuliffe as
a crewmember, NASA had arranged for many students in the US to view the launch
live at school with their teachers. Press interest in the disaster increased in
the following days; the number of reporters at KSC increased from 535 on the
day of the launch to 1,467 reporters three days later. In the aftermath of the
accident, NASA was criticized for not making key personnel available to the
press. In the absence of information, the press published articles suggesting
the external tank was the cause of the explosion. Until 2010, CNN's live
broadcast of the launch and disaster was the only known on-location video
footage from within range of the launch site. Additional amateur and
professional recordings have since become publicly available.
Engineering case
study
The Challenger accident has been used as a case study for
subjects such as engineering safety, the ethics of whistleblowing,
communications, and group decision-making, and the dangers of groupthink. Roger
Boisjoly and Allan McDonald became speakers who advocated for responsible
workplace decision-making and engineering ethics. Information designer Edward
Tufte has argued that the Challenger accident was the result of poor
communications and overly complicated explanations on the part of engineers and stated that showing the correlation of ambient air temperature and O-ring
erosion amounts would have been sufficient to communicate the potential dangers
of the cold-weather launch. Boisjoly contested this assertion and stated that
the data presented by Tufte were not as simple or available as Tufte stated.
Reports
Rogers Commission
Report
The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident, also known as the Rogers Commission after its chairman, was formed on
February 6. Its members were Chairman William P. Rogers, Vice Chairman Neil
Armstrong, David Acheson, Eugene Covert, Richard Feynman, Robert Hotz, Donald
Kutyna, Sally Ride, Robert Rummel, Joseph Sutter, Arthur Walker, Albert Wheelon,
and Chuck Yeager.
The commission held hearings that discussed the NASA
accident investigation, the Space Shuttle program, and the Morton Thiokol
recommendation to launch despite O-ring safety issues. On February 15, Rogers
released a statement that established the commission's changing role to
investigate the accident independent of NASA due to concerns about the failures of
the internal processes at NASA. The commission created four investigative
panels to research the different aspects of the mission. The Accident Analysis
Panel, chaired by Kutyna, used data from salvage operations and testing to
determine the exact cause behind the accident. The Development and Production
Panel, chaired by Sutter, investigated the hardware contractors and how they
interacted with NASA. The Pre-Launch Activities Panel, chaired by Acheson,
focused on the final assembly processes and pre-launch activities conducted at
KSC. The Mission Planning and Operations Panel, chaired by Ride, investigated
the planning that went into mission development, along with potential concerns
over crew safety and pressure to adhere to a schedule. Over four
months, the commission interviewed over 160 individuals, held at least 35
investigative sessions, and involved more than 6,000 NASA employees,
contractors, and support personnel. The commission published its report on
June 6, 1986.
The commission determined that the cause of the accident was
hot gas blowing past the O-rings in the field joint on the right SRB, and found
no other potential causes for the disaster. It attributed the accident to a
faulty design of the field joint that was unacceptably sensitive to changes in
temperature, dynamic loading, and the character of its materials. The report
was critical of NASA and Morton Thiokol, and emphasized that both organizations
had overlooked evidence that indicated the potential danger with the SRB field
joints. It noted that NASA accepted the risk of O-ring erosion without
evaluating how it could potentially affect the safety of a mission. The
commission concluded that the safety culture and management structure at NASA
were insufficient to properly report, analyze, and prevent flight issues. It
stated that the pressure to increase the rate of flights negatively affected
the amount of training, quality control, and repair work that was available for
each mission.
The commission published a series of recommendations to
improve the safety of the Space Shuttle program. It proposed a redesign of the
joints in the SRB that would prevent gas from blowing past the O-rings. It also
recommended that the program's management be restructured to keep project
managers from being pressured to adhere to unsafe organizational deadlines, and
should include astronauts to address crew safety concerns better. It proposed
that an office for safety be established reporting directly to the NASA
administrator to oversee all safety, reliability, and quality assurance
functions in NASA programs. Additionally, the commission addressed issues with
overall safety and maintenance for the orbiter, and it recommended the addition
of the means for the crew to escape during controlled gliding flight.
During a televised hearing on February 11, Feynman
demonstrated the loss of rubber's elasticity in cold temperatures using a glass
of cold water and a piece of rubber, for which he received media attention.
Feynman, a Nobel Prize-winning physicist, advocated for harsher criticism
of NASA in the report and repeatedly disagreed with Rogers. He threatened
to remove his name from the report unless it included his personal observations
on reliability, which appeared in Appendix F. In the appendix, he lauded the
engineering and software accomplishments in the program's development, but he
argued that multiple components, including the avionics and SSMEs in addition to
the SRBs, were more dangerous and accident-prone than original NASA estimates
had indicated.
US House Committee
report
The US House Committee on Science and Technology conducted
an investigation of the Challenger disaster and released a report on October
29, 1986. The committee, which had authorized the funding for the Space Shuttle
program, reviewed the findings of the Rogers Commission as part of its
investigation. The committee agreed with the Rogers Commission that the failed
SRB field joint was the cause of the accident and that NASA and Morton Thiokol
failed to act despite numerous warnings of the potential dangers of the SRB.
The committee's report further emphasized safety considerations of other
components and recommended a risk management review for all critical systems.
NASA response
SRB redesign
In response to the commission's recommendation, NASA
initiated a redesign of the SRB, later named the redesigned solid rocket motor
(RSRM), which was supervised by an independent oversight group. The redesigned
joint included a capture feature on the tang around the interior wall of the
clevis to prevent joint rotation. The space between the capture feature and the
clevis was sealed with another O-ring. The capture feature reduced the
potential of joint rotation to 15% of that which had occurred during the
disaster. Should joint rotation occur, any rotation that reduced the O-ring
seal on one side of the clevis wall would increase it on the other side?
Additionally, heaters were installed to maintain consistent, higher temperatures
of the O-rings. The RSRM was first tested on August 30, 1987. In April and
August 1988, the RSRM was tested with intentional flaws that allowed hot gas to
penetrate the field joint. These tests permitted the engineers to evaluate
whether the improved field joint prevented joint rotation. Following the
successful tests, the RSRM was certified to fly on the Space Shuttle.
Space Shuttle
modifications
In addition to the SRBs, NASA increased the safety standards
of other Space Shuttle program components. The critical items lists and failure
modes for the SSMEs were updated, along with 18 hardware changes. The maximum
thrust of the SSMEs was limited to 104%, with 109% only allowed in an abort
scenario. The landing gear was updated to improve its steering and handling
abilities while the Space Shuttle was landing. NASA implemented an escape
option in which the astronauts would jettison the side hatch and extend a pole
out of the orbiter; they would slide down the pole to avoid hitting the orbiter
as bailed out before they activated their parachutes. The orbiter's software
was modified to maintain stable flight while all of the flight crew left the
controls to escape. This escape method would not have saved the crew in the
Challenger disaster but was added in the event of another emergency.
Safety office
In 1986 NASA created a new Office of Safety, Reliability,
and Quality Assurance, headed by a NASA associate administrator who reported
directly to the NASA administrator, as the commission had specified. Former
Challenger flight director Greene became chief of the Safety Division of the directorate.
After the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003, the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded that NASA had not set up a "truly independent" office for
safety oversight. The CAIB concluded that the ineffective safety culture that
had resulted in the Challenger accident was also responsible for the subsequent
disaster.
Teacher in Space
The Teacher in Space program, which McAuliffe had been
selected for, was canceled in 1990 as a result of the Challenger disaster. In
1998, NASA replaced Teacher in Space with the Educator Astronaut Project, which
differed in that it required the teachers to become professional astronauts
trained as mission specialists, rather than short-term payload specialists who
would return to their classrooms following their spaceflight. Barbara Morgan,
who had been the backup teacher for McAuliffe, was selected to be part of NASA
Astronaut Group 17 and flew on STS-118.
Return to flight
The projected launch schedule of 24 per year was criticized
by the Rogers Commission as an unrealistic goal that created unnecessary
pressure on NASA to launch missions. In August 1986, President Reagan approved
the construction of an orbiter, which would later be named Endeavour, to
replace Challenger. Construction of Endeavour began in 1987 and was completed
in 1990, and it first flew on STS-49 in May 1992. He also announced that the
program would no longer carry commercial satellite payloads and that these
would be launched using commercial expendable launch vehicles. These commercial
payloads were reallocated from the Space Shuttle program to end the dependence
on a single launch vehicle and limit the pressure on NASA to launch crewed
missions to satisfy its customers.
The Space Shuttle fleet was grounded for two years and eight
months while the program underwent investigation, redesign, and restructuring.
On September 29, 1988, Discovery launched on STS-26 mission from LC-39B with a
crew of five veteran astronauts. Its payload was TDRS-3, which was a substitute
for the satellite lost with Challenger. The launch tested the redesigned
boosters, and the crew wore pressure suits during the ascent and reentry. The mission
was a success, and the program resumed flying.
Legacy
In 2004, President George W. Bush conferred posthumous
Congressional Space Medals of Honor to all 14 crew members killed in the Challenger
and Columbia accidents. An unpainted decorative oval in the Brumidi Corridors
of the United States Capitol was finished with a portrait depicting the crew by
Charles Schmidt in 1987. The scene was painted on canvas and then applied to
the wall. The "Forever
Remembered" exhibit at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex opened
in July 2015 and includes a display of a 12-foot (3.7 m) section of
Challenger's recovered fuselage. The exhibit was opened by NASA Administrator
Charles Bolden along with family members of the crew. A tree for each
astronaut was planted in NASA's Astronaut Memorial Grove at the Johnson Space
Center, along with trees for each astronaut from the Apollo 1 and Columbia
disasters. Seven asteroids were named after the crew members: 3350 Scobee, 3351
Smith, 3352 McAuliffe, 3353 Jarvis, 3354 McNair, 3355 Onizuka, and 3356 Resnik.
The approved naming citation was published by the Minor Planet Center on March
26, 1986 (M.P.C. 10550). In 1988, seven craters on the far side of the Moon,
within the Apollo Basin, were named after the astronauts by the IAU. The Soviet
Union named two craters on Venus after McAuliffe and Resnik. The landing site
of the Opportunity Mars rover was named Challenger Memorial Station.
Several memorials have been established in honor of the
Challenger disaster. The public Peers Park in Palo Alto, California, features
the Challenger Memorial Grove including redwood trees grown from seeds carried
aboard Challenger in 1985. Schools and streets have been renamed to include the
names of the crew or Challenger. In 1990, a 1/10 scale replica of Challenger in
liftoff position was erected in the Little Tokyo district of Los Angeles,
California. Challenger Point is a mountain peak of the Sangre de Cristo Range.
The McAuliffe-Shepard Discovery Center, a science museum and planetarium in
Concord, New Hampshire, is named in honor of McAuliffe, a Concord High School
teacher, and Alan Shepard, who was from Derry, New Hampshire. The crew's
families established the Challenger Center for Space Science Education as an
educational non-profit organization.
An American flag, later named the Challenger flag, was
carried aboard the Challenger. It was sponsored by Boy Scout Troop 514 of
Monument, Colorado, and was recovered intact, still sealed in its plastic
container. Onizuka had included a soccer ball with his personal effects that
was recovered and later flown to the International Space Station aboard Soyuz
Expedition 49 by American astronaut Shane Kimbrough. It is on display at Clear
Lake High School in Houston, which was attended by Onizuka's children.
The 1986 motion picture Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home was
dedicated to the crew of the Challenger with an opening message which stated: "The cast and crew of Star Trek wish
to dedicate this film to the men and women of the spaceship Challenger whose
courageous spirit shall live to the 23rd century and beyond..."
In media
Books
In the years immediately after the Challenger disaster,
several books were published describing the factors and causes of the accident
and the subsequent investigation and changes. In 1987, Malcolm McConnell, a
journalist and a witness of the disaster, published Challenger–A Major Malfunction:
A True Story of Politics, Greed, and the Wrong Stuff. McConnell's book was
criticized for arguing a conspiracy involving NASA Administrator Fletcher
awarding the contract to Morton Thiokol because it was from his home state of
Utah. The book Prescription for Disaster: From the Glory of Apollo to the
Betrayal of the Shuttle by Joseph Trento was also published in 1987, arguing
that the Space Shuttle program had been a flawed and politicized program from its
inception. In 1988, Feynman's memoir, "What
Do You Care What Other People Think?” Further Adventures of a Curious
Character, was published. The latter half of the book discusses his involvement
in the Rogers Commission and his relationship with Kutyna.
Books were published long after the disaster. In 1996, Diane
Vaughan published The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture,
and Deviance at NASA, which argues that NASA's structure and mission, rather
than just Space Shuttle program management, created a climate of risk
acceptance that resulted in the disaster. Also in 1996, Claus Jensen published
No Downlink: A Dramatic Narrative about the Challenger Accident and Our Time
which primarily discusses the development of rocketry before the disaster, and
was criticized for its reliance on secondary sources with little original
research conducted for the book. In 2009, Allan McDonald published his memoir
written with space historian James Hansen, Truth, Lies, and O-Rings: Inside the
Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster, which focuses on his personal involvement in
the launch, disaster, investigation, and return to flight, and is critical of
NASA and Morton Thiokol leadership for agreeing to launch Challenger despite engineers'
warnings about the O-rings.
Film and television
The ABC television movie titled Challenger was broadcast on
February 25, 1990. It stars Barry Bostwick as Scobee and Karen Allen as
McAuliffe. The movie is critical of NASA and positively portrays the engineers
who argued against launching. The movie was criticized by the widows of Smith,
McNair, and Onizuka as an inaccurate portrayal of events. A BBC docudrama
titled The Challenger Disaster was broadcast on March 18, 2013. It starred
William Hurt as Feynman and portrayed the investigation into the causes of the
disaster. A film directed by Nathan VonMinden, The Challenger Disaster, was
released on January 25, 2019, and depicts fictional characters participating in
the decision process to launch.
The four-part docuseries Challenger: The Final Flight,
created by Steven Leckart and Glen Zipper, was released by Netflix on September
16, 2020. It uses interviews with NASA and Morton Thiokol personnel to argue
against their flawed decision-making which produced a preventable disaster.
The first episode of the Australian television drama The
Newsreader, broadcast on August 15, 2021, depicts the disaster from the
perspective of the television industry, specifically the journalists and crew
within, and of, an Australian television newsroom at the time; a co-lead
character's hosting of a newsflash weaving in with an overarching background
storyline about the shift in news presentation from serious to that of allowing
emotion into its delivery.
The first episode of Season 6 of the television drama series
This Is Us, titled "The
Challenger" features the incident of the explosion in 1986 in the
flashback scenes.
Notes
The RS-25 engines had
several improvements to enhance reliability and power. During the development
program, Rocketdyne determined that the engine was capable of safe, reliable
operation at 104% of the originally specified thrust. To keep the engine thrust
values consistent with previous documentation and software, NASA kept the
originally specified thrust at 100% but had the RS-25 operate at higher
thrust.
No comments:
Post a Comment