Operation Mincemeat
was a successful British deception operation of the Second World War to
disguise the 1943 Allied invasion of Sicily. Two members of British
intelligence obtained the body of Glyndwr Michael, a tramp who died from eating
rat poison, dressed him as an officer of the Royal Marines and placed personal
items on him identifying him as the fictitious Captain (Acting Major) William
Martin. Correspondence between two British generals that suggested that the
Allies planned to invade Greece and Sardinia, with Sicily as merely the target
of a feint, was also placed on the body.
Part of the wider Operation Barclay, Mincemeat was based on
the 1939 Trout memo, written by Rear Admiral John Godfrey, the Director of the
Naval Intelligence Division, and his personal assistant, Lieutenant Commander
Ian Fleming. With the approval of the British Prime Minister, Winston
Churchill, and the military commander in the Mediterranean, General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, the plan began by transporting the body to the southern coast of
Spain by submarine and releasing it close to shore, where it was picked up the
following morning by a Spanish fisherman. The nominally neutral Spanish
government shared copies of the documents with the Abwehr, the German military
intelligence organisation, before returning the originals to the British.
Forensic examination showed they had been read and Ultra decrypts of German
messages showed that the Germans fell for the ruse. German reinforcements were
shifted to Greece and Sardinia before and during the invasion of Sicily; Sicily
received none.
The full effect of Operation Mincemeat is not known, but
Sicily was liberated more quickly than anticipated and losses were lower than
predicted. The events were depicted in Operation Heartbreak, a 1950 novel by
the former cabinet minister Duff Cooper, before one of the intelligence
officers who planned and carried out Mincemeat, Ewen Montagu, wrote a history
in 1953. Montagu's book formed the basis for the 1956 British film The Man Who
Never Was. A second British film was released in 2021, titled Operation
Mincemeat.
Background
Inspiration for
Mincemeat
On 29 September 1939, soon after the start of the Second
World War, Rear Admiral John Godfrey, the Director of Naval Intelligence,
circulated the Trout memo, a paper that compared the deception of an enemy in
wartime to fly fishing. The journalist and author Ben Macintyre observes that
although the paper was published under Godfrey's name, it "bore all the hallmarks of ... Lieutenant Commander Ian
Fleming", Godfrey's personal assistant. The memo contained a number of
schemes to be considered for use against the Axis powers to lure U-boats and
German surface ships towards minefields. Number 28 on the list was titled: "A Suggestion (not a very nice
one)"; it was an idea to plant misleading papers on a corpse that
would be found by the enemy.
The following suggestion is used in a book by Basil Thomson:
a corpse dressed as an airman, with despatches in his pockets, could be dropped
on the coast, supposedly from a parachute that has failed. I understand there
is no difficulty in obtaining corpses at the Naval Hospital, but, of course, it
would have to be a fresh one.
The deliberate planting of fake documents to be found by the
enemy was not new; known as the Haversack Ruse; it had been practiced by the
British and others in the First and Second World Wars. In August 1942, before
the Battle of Alam el Halfa, a corpse was placed in a blown-up scout car, in a
minefield facing the German 90th Light Division. On the corpse was a map
purportedly showing the locations of British minefields; the Germans used the
map, and their tanks were routed to areas of soft sand where they bogged down.
In September 1942 an aircraft flying from Britain to
Gibraltar crashed off Cádiz. All aboard were killed, including
Paymaster-Lieutenant James Hadden Turner – a courier carrying top secret
documents – and a French agent. Turner's documents included a letter from
General Mark Clark, the American Deputy Commander of the Allied Expeditionary
Force, to General Noel Mason-MacFarlane, British Governor and Commander in
Chief of Gibraltar, informing him that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the
Supreme Commander, would arrive in Gibraltar on the eve of Operation Torch's "target date" of 4 November.
Turner's body washed up on the beach near Tarifa and was recovered by the
Spanish authorities. When the body was returned to the British, the letter was
still on it, and technicians determined that the letter had not been opened.
Other Allied intelligence sources established that the notebook carried by the
French agent had been copied by the Germans, but they dismissed it as being
disinformation. To British planners, it showed that some material that was
obtained by the Spanish was being passed to the Germans.
British Intelligence
and the inspiration for the plan
A month after the Turner crash, the British intelligence officer
Charles Cholmondeley outlined his own variation of the Trout memo plan,
codenamed Trojan horse, after the Achaean deception from the Trojan War. His
plan was:
A body is obtained
from one of the London hospitals ... The lungs are filled with water and
documents are disposed in an inside pocket. The body is then dropped by a
Coastal Command aircraft ... On being found, the supposition in the enemy's
mind may well be that one of our aircraft has either been shot or forced down
and that this is one of their passengers.
Cholmondeley was a flight lieutenant in the Royal Air Force
(RAF) who had been seconded to MI5, Britain's domestic counter-intelligence and
security service. He had been appointed as the secretary of the Twenty
Committee, a small inter-service, inter-departmental intelligence team in
charge of double agents. In November 1942 the Twenty Committee turned down
Cholmondeley's plan as being unworkable, but thought there may have been some
potential in the idea. As there was a naval connection to the plan, John
Masterman, the chairman of the committee, assigned Ewen Montagu, the naval
representative, to work with Cholmondeley to develop the plan further, Montagu
– a peacetime lawyer and King's Counsel who had volunteered at the outbreak of
the war – worked under Godfrey at the Naval Intelligence Division, where he ran
NID 17(M), the sub-branch which handled counter-espionage work. Godfrey had
also appointed Montagu to oversee all naval deception involving double agents.
As part of his duties, Montagu had been briefed on the need for deception
operations to aid the Allied war aims in a forthcoming invasion operation in
the Mediterranean.
Military situation
In late 1942, with the Allied success in the North African
campaign, military planners turned their attention to the next target. British
planners considered that an invasion of France from Britain could not take
place until 1944 and the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, wanted to use the
Allied forces from North Africa to attack Europe's "soft underbelly". There were two possible targets for
the Allies to attack. The first option was Sicily; control of the island would
open the Mediterranean Sea to Allied shipping and allow the invasion of continental
Europe through Italy. The second option was to go into Greece and the Balkans,
to trap the German forces between the British and American invaders and the Soviets.
At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Allied planners agreed on the
selection of Sicily – codenamed Operation Husky – and decided to undertake the invasion
no later than July. There was concern among the Allied planners that Sicily was
an obvious choice – Churchill is reputed to have said "Everyone but a bloody fool would know that it's Sicily"
– and that the build-up of resources for the invasion would be detected.
Adolf Hitler was concerned about a Balkan invasion, as the
area had been the source of raw materials for the German war industry,
including copper, bauxite, chrome and oil. The Allies knew of Hitler's fears,
and they launched Operation Barclay, a deception operation to play upon his
concerns and to mislead the Germans into thinking the Balkans were the
objective, diverting resources from Sicily. The deception reinforced German
strategic thinking about the likely British target. To suggest the eastern
Mediterranean was the target, the Allies set up a headquarters in Cairo, Egypt,
for a fictional formation, the Twelfth Army, consisting of twelve divisions.
Military maneuvers were conducted in Syria, with numbers inflated by dummy
tanks and armored vehicles to deceive observers. Greek interpreters were
recruited and the Allies stockpiled Greek maps and currency. False
communications about troop movements were generated from the Twelfth Army
headquarters, while the Allied command post in Tunis – which was to be the
headquarters of the Sicily invasion – reduced radio traffic by using landlines
wherever possible.
Development
Montagu and Cholmondeley were assisted by an MI6 representative,
Major Frank Foley, as they examined the practicalities of the plan. Montagu
approached the pathologist Sir Bernard Spilsbury to determine what kind of body
they needed and what factors they would need to take into account to fool a
Spanish pathologist. Spilsbury informed him that those who died in an air crash
often did so from shock and not drowning; the lungs would not necessarily be
filled with water. He added that "Spaniards,
as Roman Catholics, were averse to post-mortems and did not hold them unless
the cause of death was of great importance". Spilsbury advised that a
person could have suffered one of many different causes of death, which could
be misconstrued in an autopsy. Montagu later wrote:
If a post mortem
examination was made by someone who had formed the preconceived idea that the
death was probably due to drowning there was little likelihood that the
difference between this liquid, in lungs that had started to decompose, and
seawater would be noticed.
This meant that not only would they have a better degree of
success than they previously thought, but that there would be a larger number
of corpses potentially available for selection when the time came. When Montagu
discussed the possibility of obtaining a corpse with Bentley Purchase, the
coroner for the Northern District of London, he was told there would be
practical and legal difficulties: "I
should think bodies are the only commodities not in short supply at the moment
[but] even with bodies all over the place, each one has to be accounted
for". Purchase promised to look out for a body that was suitable, with
no relatives who would claim the corpse for burial.
On 28 January 1943 Purchase contacted Montagu with the news
he had located a suitable body, probably that of Glyndwr Michael, a tramp who
died from eating rat poison that contained phosphorus. Purchase informed
Montagu and Cholmondeley that the small amount of poison in the system would
not be identified in a body that was supposed to have been floating in the sea
for several days. When Montagu commented that the under-nourished corpse did
not look like a fit field officer, Purchase informed him that "he does not have to look like an
officer – only a staff officer", more used to office work. Purchase
agreed to keep the body in the mortuary refrigerator at a temperature of 4 °C
(39 °F) – any colder and the flesh would freeze, which would be obvious after
the body defrosted. He warned Montagu and Cholmondeley that the body had to be
used within three months, after which it would have decomposed past the point
of usefulness.
Identity of the
corpse
Montagu refused to identify the individual and only
described him as "a bit of a
ne'er-do-well, and that the only worthwhile thing that he ever did he did after
his death". In 1996 Roger Morgan, an amateur historian from London,
uncovered evidence in the Public Record Office that the identity of the corpse
was Michael. An alternative theory to
the corpse's identity was suggested in the history book The Secrets of HMS
Dasher (2004) that in March 1943 there was an explosion on HMS Dasher, which
sank, killing 379 men; one of these corpses was purportedly used. The military
historian Denis Smyth dismisses the suggestion and observes that the official
records of the operation state that Glyndwr Michael was the body.
Developing the plan;
the corpse's new identity
Montagu selected the code name Mincemeat from a list of
centrally held available possibilities. On 4 February 1943 Montagu and
Cholmondeley filed their plan for the operation with the Twenty Committee; it
was a re-working of Cholmondeley's Trojan Horse plan. The Mincemeat plan was to
place documents on the corpse, and then float it off the coast of Spain, whose
nominally neutral government was known to co-operate with the Abwehr, the
German military intelligence organisation. The plan was passed by the
committee, who passed it up the chain of command to the senior Allied
strategists; Montagu and Cholmondeley were ordered to continue with their preparations
for the operation.
Montagu and Cholmondeley began to create a "legend" – a fictitious
background and character – for the body. The name and rank chosen was Captain
(Acting Major) William Martin, of the Royal Marines assigned to Combined
Operations Headquarters. The name "Martin"
was selected because there were several men with that name of about that rank
in the Royal Marines. As a Royal Marine, Major Martin came under Admiralty
authority, and it would be easy to ensure that all official inquiries and
messages about his death would be routed to the Naval Intelligence Division.
Additionally, Royal Marines would wear battledress, which was easily obtainable
and came in standard sizes. The rank of acting major made him senior enough to
be entrusted with sensitive documents, but not so prominent that anyone would
expect to know him.
To reinforce the impression of Martin being a real person,
Montagu and Cholmondeley provided corroborative details to be carried on his
person – known in espionage circles as wallet or pocket litter. These included
a photograph of an invented fiancée named Pam; the image was of an MI5 clerk,
Jean Leslie. Two love letters from Pam were included in the pocket litter, as
was a receipt for a diamond engagement ring costing £53 10s 6d from a Bond
Street jewelry shop. Additional personal correspondence was included,
consisting of a letter from the fictitious Martin's father – described by
Macintyre as "pompous and pedantic
as only an Edwardian father could be" – which included a note from the
family solicitor, and a message from Lloyds Bank, demanding payment of an overdraft
of £79 19s 2d. To ensure that the letters would remain legible after immersion
in seawater, Montagu asked MI5 scientists to conduct tests on different inks to
see which would last longest in the water, and they provided him with a
suitable list of popular and available ink brands.
Other items of pocket litter placed on Martin included a
book of stamps, a silver cross and a St. Christopher's medallion, cigarettes,
matches, a pencil stub, keys and a receipt from Gieves for a new shirt. To
provide a date that Martin had been in London, ticket stubs from a London
theatre and a bill for four nights' lodging at the Naval and Military Club were
added. Along with the other items placed on him, an itinerary of his activity
in London could be constructed from 18 to 24 April.
Attempts were made to photograph the corpse for the naval
identity card Martin would have to carry, but the results were unsatisfactory,
and it was obvious that the images were of a cadaver. Montagu and Cholmondeley
conducted a search for people who resembled the corpse, finding Captain Ronnie
Reed of MI5; Reed agreed to be photographed for the identity card, wearing a Royal
Marine uniform. As the three cards and passes needed to look not too new for a
long-serving officer, they were issued as recent replacements for lost
originals. Montagu spent the next few weeks rubbing all three cards on his
trousers to provide a used sheen to them. To provide a used look to the
uniform, it was worn by Cholmondeley, who was about the same build. The only non-issue
part to the uniform was the underwear, which was in short supply in
war-rationed Britain, so a pair of good-quality woolen underwear, owned by the
late Herbert Fisher, the Warden of New College, Oxford, was used.
Deception documents
Montagu outlined three criteria for the document that
contained the details of the falsified plans to land in the Balkans. He said
that the target should be casually but clearly identified, that it should name
Sicily and another location as cover, and that it should be in an unofficial
correspondence that would not normally be sent by diplomatic courier, or
encoded signal.
The main document was a personal letter from Lieutenant
General Sir Archibald Nye, the vice chief of the Imperial General Staff – who
had a deep knowledge of ongoing military operations – to General Sir Harold
Alexander, commander of the Anglo-American 18th Army Group in Algeria and
Tunisia under General Eisenhower. After several attempts at drafting the
document did not generate something that was considered natural, it was
suggested that Nye should draw up the letter himself to cover the required
points. The letter covered several purportedly sensitive subjects, such as the
(unwanted) award of Purple Heart medals by US forces to British servicemen
serving with them and the appointment of a new commander of the Brigade of
Guards. Montagu thought the result was "quite
brilliant"; the key part of the letter stated that
We have recent information that the Boche [the Germans] have
been reinforcing and strengthening their defenses in Greece and Crete and
C.I.G.S. [Chief of the Imperial General Staff] felt that our forces for the
assault were insufficient. It was agreed by the Chiefs of Staff that the 5th
Division should be reinforced by one Brigade Group for the assault on the beach
south of CAPE ARAXOS and that a similar reinforcement should be made for the
56th Division at KALAMATA.
The letter went on to identify Sicily and the Dodecanese as "cover targets" for the
assaults, along with justifications for their selection.
There was also a letter of introduction for Martin from his
putative commanding officer, Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the chief of
Combined Operations, to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, the
commander-in-chief Mediterranean Fleet and Allied naval commander in the
Mediterranean. Martin was referred to in the letter as an amphibious warfare
expert on loan until "the assault is
over". The document included a clumsy joke about sardines, which
Montagu inserted in the hope that the Germans would see it as a reference to a
planned invasion of Sardinia. A single black eyelash was placed within the
letter to check if the Germans or Spanish had opened it.
Montagu considered that there would be a possible "Roman Catholic prejudice against tampering
with corpses", which could miss the documents stored in the corpse's
pockets, so they added them to an official briefcase that would not be
overlooked. To justify carrying documents in a briefcase, Major Martin was
given two proof copies of the official pamphlet on combined operations written
by the author Hilary Saunders – then on Mountbatten's staff – and a letter from
Mountbatten to Eisenhower, asking him to write a brief foreword for the
pamphlet's US edition. The planning team first thought of having the handle
clutched in the corpse's hand, held in place by rigor mortis, but the rigor
would probably wear off and the briefcase would drift away. They therefore
equipped Martin with a leather-covered chain, such as was used by bank and jewelry
couriers to secure their cases against snatching. The chain unobtrusively runs
down a sleeve to the case. To Montagu it seemed unlikely that the major would
keep the bag secured to his wrist during the long flight from Britain, so the
chain was looped around the belt of his trench coat.
No comments:
Post a Comment