Foreign policy
President Kennedy's foreign policy was dominated by American
confrontations with the Soviet Union, manifested by proxy contests in the early
stage of the Cold War. In 1961 he anxiously anticipated a summit with Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev. He started off on the wrong foot by reacting
aggressively to a routine Khrushchev speech on Cold War confrontation in
early-1961. The speech was intended for domestic audiences in the Soviet Union,
but Kennedy interpreted it as a personal challenge. His mistake helped raise
tensions going into the Vienna summit of June 1961.
On the way to the summit, Kennedy stopped in Paris to meet
French President Charles de Gaulle, who advised him to ignore Khrushchev's
abrasive style. The French president feared the United States' presumed
influence in Europe. Nevertheless, de Gaulle was quite impressed with the young
president and his family. Kennedy picked up on this in his speech in Paris,
saying that he would be remembered as "the man who accompanied Jackie
Kennedy to Paris".
On June 4, 1961, the president met with Khrushchev in Vienna
and left the meetings angry and disappointed that he had allowed the premier to
bully him, despite the warnings he had received. Khrushchev, for his part, was
impressed with the president's intelligence, but thought him weak. Kennedy did
succeed in conveying the bottom line to Khrushchev on the most sensitive issue
before them, a proposed treaty between Moscow and East Berlin. He made it clear
that any treaty interfering with U.S. access rights in West Berlin would be
regarded as an act of war.
Shortly after the president returned home, the U.S.S.R.
announced its plan to sign a treaty with East Berlin, abrogating any
third-party occupation rights in either sector of the city. Depressed and
angry, Kennedy assumed that his only option was to prepare the country for
nuclear war, which he personally thought had a one-in-five chance of occurring.
In the weeks immediately following the Vienna summit, more
than 20,000 people fled from East Berlin to the western sector, reacting to
statements from the U.S.S.R. Kennedy began intensive meetings on the Berlin
issue, where Dean Acheson took the lead in recommending a military buildup
alongside NATO allies. In a July 1961
speech, Kennedy announced his decision to add $3.25 billion (equivalent to
$27.25 billion in 2018) to the defense budget, along with over 200,000
additional troops, stating that an attack on West Berlin would be taken as an
attack on the U.S. The speech received an 85% approval rating.
A month later, both the Soviet Union and East Berlin began
blocking any further passage of East Berliners into West Berlin and erected
barbed wire fences across the city, which were quickly upgraded to the Berlin
Wall. Kennedy's initial reaction was to ignore this, as long as free access
from West to East Berlin continued. This course was altered when West Berliners
had lost confidence in the defense of their position by the United States.
Kennedy sent Vice President Johnson, along with a host of military personnel,
in convoy through West Germany, including Soviet-armed checkpoints, to
demonstrate the continued commitment of the U.S. to West Berlin.
Kennedy gave a speech at Saint Anselm College on May 5,
1960, regarding America's conduct in the emerging Cold War. The address
detailed how the American foreign policy should be conducted towards African
nations, noting a hint of support for modern African nationalism by saying,
"For we, too, founded a new nation on revolt from colonial rule."
Cuba and the Bay of
Pigs Invasion
The Eisenhower administration had created a plan to
overthrow Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba. Led by the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), with help from the U.S. military, the plan was for an invasion of Cuba
by a counter-revolutionary insurgency composed of U.S.-trained, anti-Castro
Cuban exiles led by CIA paramilitary officers. The intention was to invade Cuba
and instigate an uprising among the Cuban people, hoping to remove Castro from
power. Kennedy approved the final
invasion plan on April 4, 1961.
The Bay of Pigs Invasion began on April 17, 1961. Fifteen
hundred U.S.-trained Cubans, dubbed Brigade 2506, landed on the island. No U.S.
air support was provided. CIA director Allen Dulles later stated that they
thought the president would authorize any action that was needed for success
once the troops were on the ground.
By April 19, 1961, the Cuban government had captured or
killed the invading exiles, and Kennedy was forced to negotiate for the release
of the 1,189 survivors. Twenty months later, Cuba released the captured exiles
in exchange for $53 million worth of food and medicine. The incident made Castro feel wary of the U.S.
and led him to believe that another invasion would take place.
Biographer Richard Reeves said that Kennedy focused
primarily on the political repercussions of the plan rather than military
considerations. When it proved unsuccessful, he was convinced that the plan was
a setup to make him look bad. He took
responsibility for the failure, saying, "We got a big kick in the leg and
we deserved it. But maybe we'll learn something from it." He appointed Robert Kennedy to help lead a
committee to examine the causes of the failure.
In late-1961, the White House formed the Special Group
(Augmented), headed by Robert Kennedy and including Edward Lansdale, Secretary
Robert McNamara, and others. The group's objective—to overthrow Castro via
espionage, sabotage, and other covert tactics—was never pursued.
Cuban Missile Crisis
On October 14, 1962, CIA U-2 spy planes took photographs of
the Soviets' construction of intermediate-range ballistic missile sites in
Cuba. The photos were shown to Kennedy on October 16; a consensus was reached that
the missiles were offensive in nature and thus posed an immediate nuclear
threat.
Kennedy faced a dilemma: if the U.S. attacked the sites, it
might lead to nuclear war with the U.S.S.R., but if the U.S. did nothing, it
would be faced with the increased threat from close-range nuclear weapons. The
U.S. would also appear to the world as less committed to the defense of the
hemisphere. On a personal level, Kennedy needed to show resolve in reaction to
Khrushchev, especially after the Vienna summit.
More than a third of U.S. National Security Council (NSC)
members favored an unannounced air assault on the missile sites, but for some
of them this conjured up an image of "Pearl Harbor in reverse". There
was also some concern from the international community (asked in confidence),
that the assault plan was an overreaction in light of the fact that Eisenhower
had placed PGM-19 Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey in 1958. It also could
not be assured that the assault would be 100% effective. In concurrence with a majority-vote of the
NSC, Kennedy decided on a naval quarantine. On October 22, he dispatched a
message to Khrushchev and announced the decision on TV.
The U.S. Navy would stop and inspect all Soviet ships
arriving off Cuba, beginning October 24. The Organization of American States
gave unanimous support to the removal of the missiles. The president exchanged
two sets of letters with Khrushchev, to no avail.[140] United Nations (UN)
Secretary General U Thant requested both parties to reverse their decisions and
enter a cooling-off period. Khrushchev agreed, but Kennedy did not.
One Soviet-flagged ship was stopped and boarded. On October
28, Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the missile sites, subject to UN inspections.
The U.S. publicly promised never to invade
Cuba and privately agreed to remove its Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey,
which were by then obsolete and had been supplanted by submarines equipped with
UGM-27 Polaris missiles.
This crisis brought the world closer to nuclear war than at
any point before or after. It is considered that "the humanity" of
both Khrushchev and Kennedy prevailed. The crisis improved the image of American
willpower and the president's credibility. Kennedy's approval rating increased
from 66% to 77% immediately thereafter.
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