Economic
policy
Mussolini launched several public construction programs and
government initiatives throughout Italy to combat economic setbacks or
unemployment levels. His earliest (and one of the best known) was the Battle
for Wheat, by which 5,000 new farms were established and five new agricultural
towns (among them Littoria and Sabaudia) on land reclaimed by draining the
Pontine Marshes. In Sardinia, a model agricultural town was founded and named
Mussolinia (it has long since been renamed Arborea). This town was the first of
what Mussolini hoped would be thousands of new agricultural settlements across
the country. The Battle for Wheat diverted valuable resources to wheat production
from other more economically viable crops. Landowners grew wheat on unsuitable
soil using all the advances of modern science, and although the wheat harvest
increased, prices rose, consumption fell and high tariffs were imposed. The
tariffs promoted widespread inefficiencies and the government subsidies given
to farmers pushed the country further into debt.
Mussolini also initiated the "Battle for Land", a policy based on land reclamation
outlined in 1928. The initiative had a mixed success; while projects such as
the draining of the Pontine Marsh in 1935 for agriculture were good for
propaganda purposes, provided work for the unemployed and allowed for great
land owners to control subsidies; other areas in the Battle for Land were not
very successful. This program was inconsistent with the Battle for Wheat (small
plots of land were inappropriately allocated for large-scale wheat production),
and the Pontine Marsh was lost during World War II. Fewer than 10,000 peasants
resettled on the redistributed land, and peasant poverty remained high. The
Battle for Land initiative was abandoned in 1940.
In 1930, in "The Doctrine of Fascism" he wrote, "The so-called crisis can only be
settled by State action and within the orbit of the State." He tried
to combat economic recession by introducing a "Gold for the Fatherland" initiative, encouraging the
public to voluntarily donate gold jewelry to government officials in exchange
for steel wristbands bearing the words "Gold
for the Fatherland". The collected gold was melted down and turned
into gold bars, which were then distributed to the national banks.
Government control of business was part of Mussolini's
policy planning. By 1935, he claimed that three-quarters of Italian businesses
were under state control. Later that year, Mussolini issued several edicts to
further control the economy, e.g. forcing banks, businesses, and private
citizens to surrender all foreign-issued stock and bond holdings to the Bank of
Italy. In 1936, he imposed price controls. He also attempted to turn Italy into
a self-sufficient autarky, instituting high barriers on trade with most
countries except Germany.
In 1943, Mussolini proposed the theory of economic socialization.
Railways
Mussolini was keen to take the credit for major public works
in Italy, particularly the railway system. His reported overhauling of the
railway network led to the popular saying, "Say
what you like about Mussolini, he made the trains run on time." Kenneth
Roberts, journalist and novelist, wrote in 1924:
The difference between
the Italian railway service in 1919, 1920 and 1921 and that which obtained
during the first year of the Mussolini regime was almost beyond belief. The
cars were clean, the employees were snappy and courteous, and trains arrived at
and left the stations on time — not fifteen minutes late, and not five minutes
late; but on the minute.
In fact, the improvement in Italy's dire post-war railway
system had begun before Mussolini took power. The improvement was also more
apparent than real. Bergen Evans wrote in 1954:
The author was
employed as a courier by the Franco-Belgique Tours Company in the summer of
1930, the height of Mussolini's heyday, when a fascist guard rode on every
train, and is willing to make an affidavit to the effect that most Italian
trains on which he traveled were not on schedule—or near it. There must be
thousands who can support this attestation. It's a trifle, but it's worth
nailing down.
George Seldes wrote in 1936 that although the express trains
carrying tourists generally—though not always—ran on schedule, the same was not
true for the smaller lines, where delays were frequent, while Ruth Ben-Ghiat
has said that "they improved the
lines that had a political meaning to them".
Propaganda and cult
of personality
Mussolini's foremost priority was the subjugation of the
minds of the Italian people through the use of propaganda. The regime promoted
a lavish cult of personality centered on the figure of Mussolini. He pretended
to incarnate the new fascist Übermensch, promoting an aesthetic of exasperated
Machismo that attributed to him quasi-divine capacities. At various times after
1922, Mussolini personally took over the ministries of the interior, foreign
affairs, colonies, corporations, defence, and public works. Sometimes he held
as many as seven departments simultaneously, as well as the premiership. He was
also head of the all-powerful Fascist Party and the armed local fascist
militia, the MVSN or "Blackshirts",
who terrorized incipient resistance in the cities and provinces. He would later
form the OVRA, an institutionalized secret police that carried official state
support. In this way he succeeded in keeping power in his own hands and
preventing the emergence of any rival.
All teachers in schools and universities had to swear an
oath to defend the fascist regime. Newspaper editors were all personally chosen
by Mussolini, and only those in possession of a certificate of approval from
the Fascist Party could practice journalism. These certificates were issued in
secret; Mussolini thus skillfully created the illusion of a "free press". The trade unions
were also deprived of any independence and were integrated into what was called
the "corporative" system.
The aim was to place all Italians in various professional organisations or
corporations, all under clandestine governmental control.
Large sums of money were spent on highly visible public
works and on international prestige projects. These included as the Blue Riband
ocean liner SS Rex; setting aeronautical records with the world's fastest
seaplane, the Macchi M.C.72; and the transatlantic flying boat cruise of Italo
Balbo, which was greeted with much fanfare in the United States when it landed
in Chicago in 1933.
The principles of the doctrine of Fascism were laid down in
an article by eminent philosopher Giovanni Gentile and Mussolini himself that
appeared in 1932 in the Enciclopedia Italiana. Mussolini always portrayed
himself as an intellectual, and some historians agree. Gunther called him "easily the best educated and most
sophisticated of the dictators", and the only national leader of 1940
who was an intellectual. German historian Ernst Nolte said that "His command of contemporary philosophy
and political literature was at least as great as that of any other
contemporary European political leader."
Culture
Nationalists in the years after World War I thought of
themselves as combating the liberal and domineering institutions created by
cabinets—such as those of Giovanni Giolitti, including traditional schooling.
Futurism, a revolutionary cultural movement which would serve as a catalyst for
Fascism, argued for "a school for
physical courage and patriotism", as expressed by Filippo Tommaso
Marinetti in 1919. Marinetti expressed his disdain for "the by now prehistoric and troglodyte Ancient Greek and Latin
courses", arguing for their replacement with exercise modelled on
those of the Arditi soldiers. It was in those years that the first Fascist
youth wings were formed: Avanguardia Giovanile Fascista (Fascist Youth
Vanguards) in 1919 and Gruppi Universitari Fascisti (Fascist University Groups)
in 1922.
After the March on Rome that brought Mussolini to power, the
Fascists started considering ways to politicize Italian society, with an accent
on education. Mussolini assigned former ardito and deputy-secretary for
Education Renato Ricci the task of "reorganizing
the youth from a moral and physical point of view". The Opera
Nazionale Balilla was created through Mussolini's decree of 3 April 1926, and
was led by Ricci for the following eleven years. It included children between
the ages of 8 and 18, grouped as the Balilla and the Avanguardisti.
According to Mussolini: "Fascist
education is moral, physical, social, and military: it aims to create a
complete and harmoniously developed human, a fascist one according to our
views". The "educational value set through action and example"
was to replace the established approaches. Fascism opposed its version of
idealism to prevalent rationalism, and used the Opera Nazionale Balilla to
circumvent educational tradition by imposing the collective and hierarchy, as
well as Mussolini's own personality cult.
Another important constituent of the Fascist cultural policy
was Catholicism. In 1929, a concordat with the Vatican was signed, ending
decades of struggle between the Italian state and the papacy that dated back to
the 1870 takeover of the Papal States by the House of Savoy during the
unification of Italy. The Lateran Treaty, by which the Italian state was at
last recognised by the Catholic Church, and the independence of Vatican City
was recognised by the Italian state, were so much appreciated by the
ecclesiastic hierarchy that Pope Pius XI acclaimed Mussolini as "the Man of Providence".
The 1929 treaty included a legal provision whereby the
Italian government would protect the honour and dignity of the Pope by
prosecuting offenders. Mussolini had had his children baptized in 1923 and
himself re-baptized by a Catholic priest in 1927. After 1929, Mussolini, with
his anti-communist doctrines, convinced many Catholics to actively support him.
Foreign policy
In foreign policy, Mussolini was pragmatic and
opportunistic. His vision centered on forging a new Roman Empire in Africa and
the Balkans, vindicating the so-called "mutilated
victory" of 1918 imposed by Britain and France, which betrayed the
Treaty of London and denied Italy its "natural
right" to supremacy in the Mediterranean. However, in the 1920s, given
Germany's weakness, post-war reconstruction, and reparations issues, Europe's
situation was unfavorable for openly revising the Treaty of Versailles. Italy's
foreign policy focused on maintaining an "equidistant"
stance from major powers to exercise "determinant
weight," using alignment with one power to secure support for Italian
ambitions in Europe and Africa. Mussolini believed that Italy's population,
then at 40 million, was insufficient for a major war, and sought to increase it
to at least 60 million through relentless natalist policies, including making
advocacy of contraception a criminal offense in 1924.
Initially, Mussolini operated as a pragmatic statesman,
seeking advantages without risking war with Britain and France. An exception
was the 1923 Corfu incident, where Mussolini was prepared for war with Britain
over the assassination of Italian military personnel, but was persuaded to
accept a diplomatic solution by the Italian Navy's leadership. In 1925,
Mussolini secretly told Italian military leaders that Italy needed to win
spazio vitale ('living space'),
aiming to unite the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean under Italian control,
though he acknowledged that Italy lacked sufficient manpower for war until the
mid-1930s. Mussolini participated in the Locarno Treaties of 1925, which
guaranteed Germany's western borders. In 1929, he began planning for aggression
against France and Yugoslavia, and by 1932 sought an anti-French alliance with
Germany. A planned attack on France and Yugoslavia in 1933 was aborted when
Mussolini learned that French intelligence had broken Italian military codes.
After Adolf Hitler rose to power, threatening Italian interests in Austria and
the Danube basin, Mussolini proposed the Four Power Pact with Britain, France,
and Germany in 1933. Italy also signed the Italo-Soviet Pact which was partly
intended as a warning to Germany. When Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss
was assassinated in 1934 by Austrian Nazis during a coup, Mussolini threatened Hitler
with war in the event of a German invasion of Austria, and opposed any German
attempt at Anschluss, promoting the Stresa Front against Germany in 1935.
Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I had to flee due to
Mussolini's invasion. Selassie met Mussolini in 1924 when he had visited Rome
as Regent.
Despite earlier opposition to the Italo-Turkish War, after
the Abyssinia Crisis of 1935–1936, Mussolini invaded Ethiopia following border
incidents between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. Historians are divided on
the reasons for the invasion. Some argue it was a distraction from the Great
Depression, while others see it as part of a broader expansionist program.
Italy’s forces quickly overwhelmed Ethiopia, leading to the proclamation of an Italian
Empire in May 1936. Confident of French support due to his opposition to
Hitler, Mussolini dismissed the League of Nations' sanctions imposed over the
Ethiopian invasion. He viewed the sanctions as hypocritical attempts by older
imperial powers to block Italy’s expansion. Italy was criticized for its use of
mustard gas and brutal tactics against Ethiopian guerrillas. Mussolini ordered
systematic terror against Ethiopian rebels, targeting both combatants and
civilians. Mussolini ordered the execution of the entire adult male population
in a town and in one district ordered that "the prisoners, their
accomplices and the uncertain will have to be executed" as part of the "gradual liquidation" of the
population. Mussolini favoured a policy of brutality partly because he believed
the Ethiopians were not a nation because black people were too stupid to have a
sense of nationality. The other reason was because Mussolini was planning on
bringing millions of Italians into Ethiopia and wanted to kill off much of the
population to make room.
Sanctions against Italy pushed Mussolini towards an alliance
with Germany. In 1936, he told the German Ambassador that Italy had no
objections to Austria becoming a German satellite, removing a key obstacle to
Italo-German relations. After the sanctions ended, France and Britain tried to
revive the Stresa Front, seeking to retain Italy as an ally. However, in 1936,
Mussolini agreed to the Rome-Berlin Axis with Germany, and in 1939 signed the
Pact of Steel, binding Italy and Germany in a full military alliance.
The conquest of Ethiopia cost 12,000 Italian lives and
placed a severe financial burden on Italy. Mussolini had underestimated the
cost of the invasion, which proved far higher than expected, and the ongoing
occupation further strained Italy’s economy. The Ethiopian and Spanish wars
consumed funds intended for military modernization, weakening Italy's military
power. From 1936 to 1939, Mussolini provided substantial military support to
Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War, further distancing Italy from France and
Britain. This intervention and the worsening relationship with the Western
powers led Mussolini to accept the German annexation of Austria and the
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. At the Munich Conference in 1938, Mussolini
posed as a peacemaker while supporting Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland.
In 1938, TIGR, a Slovene partisan group, plotted to
assassinate Mussolini in Kobarid, but their attempt was unsuccessful.
World War II
Gathering storm
By the late 1930s, Mussolini concluded that Britain and
France were declining powers, and that Germany and Italy, due to their
demographic strength, were destined to rule Europe. He believed that the
declining birth rates in France were "absolutely
horrifying" and that the British Empire was doomed because one-quarter
of the British population was over 50. Mussolini preferred an alliance with
Germany over Britain and France, viewing it as better to be allied with the strong
instead of the weak. He saw international relations as a Social Darwinian
struggle between "virile"
nations with high birth rates destined to destroy "effete" nations with low birth rates. Mussolini had no
interest in an alliance with France, which he considered a "weak and old" nation due to its declining birthrate.
Mussolini's belief in Italy's destino to rule the
Mediterranean led him to neglect serious planning for a war with the Western
powers. He was held back from full alignment with Berlin by Italy's economic
and military unpreparedness and his desire to use the Easter Accords of April
1938 to split Britain from France. A military alliance with Germany, rather
than the looser political alliance under the Anti-Comintern Pact, would end any
chance of Britain implementing the Easter Accords. The Easter Accords were
intended by Mussolini to allow Italy to take on France alone, with the hope
that improved Anglo-Italian relations would keep Britain neutral in a
Franco-Italian war (Mussolini had designs on Tunisia and some support in that
country). Britain, in turn, hoped the Easter Accords would win Italy away from
Germany.
Count Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini's son-in-law and foreign
minister, summed up the dictator's objectives regarding France in his diary on
8 November 1938: Djibouti would be ruled jointly with France; Tunisia with a
similar regime; and Corsica under Italian control Mussolini showed no interest
in Savoy, considering it neither "historically
nor geographically Italian." On 30 November 1938, Mussolini provoked
the French by orchestrating demonstrations where deputies demanded France turn
over Tunisia, Savoy, and Corsica to Italy. This led to heightened tensions,
with France and Italy on the verge of war through the winter of 1938–39.
In January 1939, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain
visited Rome. Mussolini learned that while Britain wanted better relations with
Italy, it would not sever ties with France. This realization led Mussolini to
grow more interested in the German offer of a military alliance, first made in
May 1938. In February 1939, Mussolini declared that a state's power is "proportional to its maritime
position," asserting that Italy was a "prisoner in the Mediterranean," surrounded by British-controlled
territories.
Italian Empire in
1939
The new pro-German course was controversial. On 21 March
1939, during a meeting of the Fascist Grand Council, Italo Balbo accused
Mussolini of "licking Hitler's
boots" and criticized the pro-German policy as leading Italy to
disaster. Despite some internal opposition, Mussolini's control of foreign policy
ensured that dissenting voices had little impact. In April 1939, Mussolini
ordered the Italian invasion of Albania, quickly occupying the country and forcing
King Zog I to flee. In May 1939, Mussolini signed the Pact of Steel, a full
military alliance with Germany, after securing a promise from Hitler that there
would be no war for three years.
Despite the pact, Mussolini was cautious. When Hitler
expressed his intent to invade Poland, Ciano warned that this would likely lead
to war with the Allies. Hitler dismissed the warning, suggesting Italy should
invade Yugoslavia. Although tempted, Mussolini knew that Italy was unprepared
for a global conflict, particularly given King Victor Emmanuel III's demand for
neutrality. Thus, when World War II began with Germany’s invasion of Poland on
1 September 1939, Italy remained uninvolved. However, when the Germans arrested
183 professors from Jagiellonian University in Kraków in November 1939,
Mussolini intervened personally, resulting in the release of 101 Poles.
War declared
As World War II began, Ciano and Viscount Halifax were
holding secret phone conversations. The British wanted Italy on their side
against Germany as it had been in World War I. French government opinion was
more geared towards action against Italy, as they were eager to attack Italy in
Libya. In September 1939, France swung to the opposite extreme, offering to
discuss issues with Italy, but as the French were unwilling to discuss Corsica,
Nice and Savoy, Mussolini did not answer. Mussolini's Under-Secretary for War
Production, Carlo Favagrossa, had estimated that Italy could not be prepared
for major military operations until 1942 due to its relatively weak industrial
sector compared to Western Europe. In late November 1939, Adolf Hitler declared:
"So long as the Duce lives, one can
rest assured that Italy will seize every opportunity to achieve its
imperialistic aims."
Convinced that the war would soon be over, with a German
victory looking likely at that point, Mussolini decided to enter the war on the
Axis side. Accordingly, Italy declared war on Britain and France on 10 June
1940. Mussolini regarded the war against Britain and France as a life-or-death
struggle between opposing ideologies—fascism and the "plutocratic and reactionary democracies of the west"—describing
the war as "the struggle of the
fertile and young people against the sterile people moving to the sunset; it is
the struggle between two centuries and two ideas".
Italy joined the Germans in the Battle of France, by
launching the Italian invasion of France just beyond the border. Just eleven
days later, France and Germany signed an armistice and on 24 June, Italy and
France signed the Franco-Italian Armistice. Included in Italian-controlled
France were most of Nice and other southeastern counties. Mussolini planned to
concentrate Italian forces on a major offensive against the British Empire in
Africa and the Middle East, known as the "parallel
war", while expecting the collapse of the UK in the European theatre.
The Italians invaded Egypt, bombed Mandatory Palestine, and attacked the
British in their Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland colonies (in what would
become known as the East African Campaign); British Somaliland was conquered
and became part of Italian East Africa on 3 August 1940, and there were Italian
advances in the Sudan and Kenya with initial success. The British government
refused to accept proposals for a peace that would involve accepting Axis
victories in Europe; plans for an invasion of the UK did not proceed and the
war continued.
Path to defeat
In September 1940, the Italian Tenth Army was commanded by
Marshal Rodolfo Graziani and crossed from Italian Libya into Egypt, where
British forces were located; this would become the Western Desert Campaign.
Advances were successful, but the Italians stopped at Sidi Barrani waiting for
logistic supplies to catch up. On 24 October 1940, Mussolini sent the Italian
Air Corps to Belgium, where it took part in the Blitz until January 1941. In
October, Mussolini also sent Italian forces into Greece, starting the
Greco-Italian War. The Royal Air Force prevented the Italian invasion and
allowed the Greeks to push the Italians back to Albania, but the Greek
counter-offensive in Italian Albania ended in a stalemate.
Events in Africa had changed by early 1941 as Operation
Compass had forced the Italians back into Libya, causing high losses in the
Italian Army. Also in the East African Campaign, an attack was mounted against
Italian forces. Despite putting up some stiff resistance, they were overwhelmed
at the Battle of Keren, and the Italian defence started to crumble with a final
defeat in the Battle of Gondar. When addressing the Italian public on the
events, Mussolini was open about the situation, saying "We call bread bread and wine wine, and when the enemy wins a
battle it is useless and ridiculous to seek, as the English do in their
incomparable hypocrisy, to deny or diminish it." With the Axis
invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece, Italy annexed Ljubljana, Dalmatia and
Montenegro, and established the puppet states of Croatia and the Hellenic
State.
General Mario Robotti, Commander of the Italian XI Corps in
Slovenia and Croatia, issued an order in line with a directive received from
Mussolini in June 1942: "I would not
be opposed to all (sic) Slovenes being imprisoned and replaced by Italians. In
other words, we should take steps to ensure that political and ethnic frontiers
coincide".
Mussolini first learned of Operation Barbarossa after the
invasion of the Soviet Union had begun on 22 June 1941, and was not asked by
Hitler to involve himself. On 25 June 1941, he inspected the first units at
Verona, which served as his launching pad to Russia. Mussolini told the Council
of Ministers of 5 July that his only worry was that Germany might defeat the
Soviet Union before the Italians arrived. At a meeting with Hitler in August,
Mussolini offered and Hitler accepted the commitment of further Italian troops
to fight the Soviet Union. The heavy losses suffered by the Italians on the
Eastern Front, where service was extremely unpopular owing to the widespread
view that this was not Italy's fight, did much to damage Mussolini's prestige
with the Italian people. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he declared
war on the United States on 11 December 1941. A piece of evidence regarding
Mussolini's response to the attack on Pearl Harbor comes from the diary of his
Foreign Minister Ciano:
A night telephone call
from Ribbentrop. He is overjoyed about the Japanese attack on America. He is so
happy about it that I am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the
final advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain, that America
will enter the conflict and that the conflict will be so long that she will be
able to realize all her potential forces. This morning I told this to the King
who had been pleased about the event. He ended by admitting that, in the long
run, I may be right. Mussolini was happy, too. For a long time he has favored a
definite clarification of relations between America and the Axis.
Italian forces had also achieved some victories suppressing
partisan activities in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania and in Montenegro. In
North Africa, together with German forces. Italian forces would drive the
British forces out of Libya during the Battle of Gazala and pushed towards to
Egypt with the aim of capturing Alexandria and the Suez Canal, but the
offensive was halted at El Alamein in summer of 1942. On October 1942, the
Second Battle of El Alamein began. Italian forces was severely defeated by the
British and Commonwealth forces and got driven out of Egypt, the British and
Commonwealth forces would drive the Italians until January 1943 when the
capital of the Italian Libya, Tripoli fell into the Allies. Following Vichy
France's collapse and the Case Anton on November 1942, Italy occupied the
French territories of Corsica and Tunisia. Italian forces would use Tunisia as
a base of military operations for the Tunisian campaign.
Although Mussolini was aware that Italy, whose resources
were reduced by the campaigns of the 1930s, was not ready for a long war, he
opted to remain in the conflict to not abandon the occupied territories and the
fascist imperial ambitions.
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